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MMW D-1/3a

March 17, 1959

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MACMILLAN TALKS
Washington, March 19-23, 1959

European Security
(Position Paper)

In earlier version of this paper, circulated as D-1/3, was drafted by GEM - Mr. Lempson and cleared by EUR - Mr. Kohler; CIE - Mr. Vigdarsen; S/AS - Mr. Sullivan; SA - Mr. Tansenden; SEC - Mr. Talmont and IS - Mr. McCoskey. The attached paper replaces D-1/3, which should be destroyed.

This paper reflects the refinements made in D-1/3 at an interbureau meeting in the Acting Secretary's office on March 16.

It is circulated for your information.

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Washington, March 19-23, 1959

European Security

Anticipated British Position

1. The British may urge limited steps on European security in advance of progress on German reunification. They may cite Khrushchey talks as substantiating their belief that the USSR might accept some proposals in this field and argue that even a limited agreement would reduce the danger of war over Berlin.
2. They may suggest a zone of limitation of forces, with inspection in an area of Germany east of the Rhine and a corresponding area east of the GDR frontier.
3. They may suggest a small concession towards relaxation of tensions by proposing that a narrow zone along the frontier in West Germany be demilitarized. They may argue this would not represent any change in actual British deployment since British troops are not now advanced beyond the Weser River.
4. They will probably agree that no major shift in troop deployment can be contemplated unless an agreement on reunification is reached.

Recommended United States Position

1. Limited European security agreements not linked with German reunification would only result in strategic gains for the USSR without compensating gains for us. Such arrangements could create an illusion that the threat had been reduced, whereas in fact the basic security situation would not be improved. The North Atlantic Council has studied and rejected proposals of this character, such as the Rapacki Plan, both in its original form and as modified.
2. The question of an inspection zone and arms limitations in Europe is primarily for the West Europeans to decide. Neither the French nor the Germans are disposed to accept such a plan. Also, there are advantages to linking a zone of inspection in Europe to one which would provide protection against surprise attack over a larger area: e.g., the Arctic.
3. A limited agreement confined to a narrow demilitarized zone based on the dividing line between East and West Germany would be dangerous in creating the illusion of reduced threat while not in fact changing the basic security situation. It would be a political gain for the USSR without any compensating gains on our part.
4. We share the British view that major troop deployments can only be considered in connection with a political settlement - which for European deployment means German reunification. However, our security and reunification proposals might be more effectively presented if related more closely with our over-all disarmament proposals - e.g., linking troop reductions in Europe to the over-all reductions we proposed in London in 1957 if certain political problems were solved.

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By bc NLE Date 7/15/15

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